Agent-to-Agent · ComputeID

Who let your AI agent do that?

A trust plane that lets autonomous agents act on a human's behalf — across organizations — with authority you can cryptographically verify.

01

Agents have started to act for us

  • They call models and APIs on your behalf.
  • They reach across organizations to get work done.
  • And today there is no proof of who authorized what.

Blanket API keys are over-powered and audit-opaque. No key means no collaboration. That gap is where ComputeID lives.

02

Two people, two agents, two orgs

Acme Inc.
Alicehuman principal
Adaher AI agent · orchestrator
Meac Inc.
Bobhuman principal
Borishis AI agent · worker

Alice authorizes Ada. Ada needs Meac Inc.'s pricing, so it delegates cross-org to Boris — and Boris acts on Alice's behalf.

03

Element 1 — Identity

Every agent gets a verifiable passport from ComputeID.

  • Its own military-grade cryptographic identity.
  • A public profile anyone can independently verify.
  • Anchored in hardware-grade, tamper-resistant trust.
04

Element 2 — Delegation

DRP — the Delegation Receipt Protocol.

Alice
invoke · read · write
Ada
invoke · read
Boris
invoke

Each hop is a cryptographically sealed, tamper-evident receipt. Scope only ever narrows — no agent can grant more than it was given.

05

Element 3 — the trust plane

Every model call passes through the trust-plane gateway.

the agent's identity its delegation chain the capability it needs

The gateway verifies the chain, then allows or denies the call — and writes an immutable audit record. Built end-to-end on a trusted, enterprise-ready, open-source stack, running entirely in your private cloud.

06

Why the world needs this

OAuth gave humans delegated, scoped, revocable access. Autonomous agents have had nothing like it.

  • Authority is anchored to a human, not the agent.
  • It can be scoped and time-boxed.
  • Every action is provable and accountable.
07
Proof · attack rejected

Scope widening

Boris tries to grant himself more than Ada held.

rejected — capability scope widened at hop 1

Every grant must be a subset of the one before it. The signatures make the parent scope un-forgeable.

08
Proof · attack rejected

A rogue, unregistered agent

An agent that was never issued an identity forges a chain.

rejected — no descriptor for issuer

Every issuer's public key must resolve at its published address. An unknown issuer fails signature verification at the very first hop.

09
Proof · attack rejected

Cross-principal contamination

Reuse Alice's chain to act as if for Bob.

principal pinned to Alice — not forgeable to Bob

The principal is set when the human self-issues hop 0, and is cryptographically pinned through every hop. You cannot relabel whose authority it is.

Verifiable authority for autonomous agents

Identity → delegation → a trust plane that proves it — and logs it.

100% open-source · runs in your private cloud · enterprise-ready.

ComputeID

11

How the layers fit — and when

1
Identityevery agent gets a verifiable passport
at onboarding
2
Delegationauthority narrows down a signed chain
on hand-off
3
Trust planechecks identity + chain + capability → allow or deny
every call
4
Auditappend-only, held by both sides — tamper-evident
always
12

Key take-aways

  • Agents finally work across companies with authority you can verify — not blind trust.
  • That authority is anchored to a human, scoped, and only ever narrows.
  • Every call is checked and logged — provable and tamper-evident.
  • Open-source, private-cloud, enterprise-ready — no blockchain needed.
Alice
AliceAcme Inc.
Bob
BobMeac Inc.
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