Agent-to-Agent · ComputeID
Who let your AI agent do that?
A trust plane that lets autonomous agents act
on a human's behalf — across organizations —
with authority you can cryptographically verify.
01
Agents have started to act for us
- They call models and APIs on your behalf.
- They reach across organizations to get work done.
- And today there is no proof of who authorized what.
Blanket API keys are over-powered and audit-opaque. No key means no
collaboration. That gap is where ComputeID lives.
02
Two people, two agents, two orgs
Acme Inc.
Alicehuman principal
Adaher AI agent · orchestrator
→
Meac Inc.
Bobhuman principal
Borishis AI agent · worker
Alice authorizes Ada. Ada needs Meac Inc.'s pricing, so it delegates
cross-org to Boris — and Boris acts on Alice's behalf.
03
Element 1 — Identity
Every agent gets a verifiable passport from ComputeID.
- Its own military-grade cryptographic identity.
- A public profile anyone can independently verify.
- Anchored in hardware-grade, tamper-resistant trust.
04
Element 2 — Delegation
DRP — the Delegation Receipt Protocol.
Alice
invoke · read · write
▶
Ada
invoke · read
▶
Boris
invoke
Each hop is a cryptographically sealed, tamper-evident
receipt. Scope only ever narrows — no agent can grant more than it was given.
05
Element 3 — the trust plane
Every model call passes through the trust-plane gateway.
◆agentAda / Boris
gateway
identitychaincapability
▤auditappend-only
The gateway verifies the chain, then allows or
denies the call — and writes an immutable audit record.
Built end-to-end on a trusted, enterprise-ready, open-source stack,
running entirely in your private cloud.
06
Why the world needs this
OAuth gave humans delegated, scoped, revocable
access. Autonomous agents have had nothing like it.
- Authority is anchored to a human, not the agent.
- It can be scoped and time-boxed.
- Every action is provable and accountable.
07
Proof · attack rejected
Scope widening
Boris tries to grant himself more than Ada held.
✗
rejected — capability scope widened at hop 1
Every grant must be a subset of the one before it. The signatures make
the parent scope un-forgeable.
08
Proof · attack rejected
A rogue, unregistered agent
An agent that was never issued an identity
forges a chain.
✗
rejected — no descriptor for issuer
Every issuer's public key must resolve at its published address. An
unknown issuer fails signature verification at the very first hop.
09
Proof · attack rejected
Cross-principal contamination
Reuse Alice's chain to act as if for Bob.
✗
principal pinned to Alice — not forgeable to Bob
The principal is set when the human self-issues hop 0, and is
cryptographically pinned through every hop. You cannot relabel whose authority it is.
✓
Verifiable authority for autonomous agents
Identity → delegation → a trust plane that proves it — and logs it.
100% open-source · runs in your private cloud · enterprise-ready.
ComputeID
11
How the layers fit — and when
1
Identityevery agent gets a verifiable passport
at onboarding
2
Delegationauthority narrows down a signed chain
on hand-off
3
Trust planechecks identity + chain + capability → allow or deny
every call
4
Auditappend-only, held by both sides — tamper-evident
always
12
Key take-aways
- Agents finally work across companies with authority you can verify — not blind trust.
- That authority is anchored to a human, scoped, and only ever narrows.
- Every call is checked and logged — provable and tamper-evident.
- Open-source, private-cloud, enterprise-ready — no blockchain needed.